

Message Text

SECRET

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DRAFTED BY AF/WBEDMONDSON

APPROVED BY D:CWROBINSON

AF - WESCHAUFLE

S/S - FVORTIZ

S - DPASSAGE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 297891 TOSEC 320030

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, RH

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: TALKING POINTS FOR WISNER'S
USE WITH IAN SMITH (S/S 7625180)

TO THE SECRETARY FROM AF-SCHAUFLE THROUGH MR. ROBINSON

1. PROBLEM. IAN SMITH ARRIVES IN GENEVA TOMORROW AND
WISNER HAS AN APPOINTMENT WITH HIM DEC. 9. WE THEREFORE
PROPOSE THAT YOU CABLE THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA-
GRAPH 2 TO GENEVA FOR WISNER'S USE WITH SMITH. IF
SMITH PLANS TO TABLE HIS PAPER ON DEC. 8, WE BELIEVE
WISNER SHOULD REQUEST MEETING BEFORE THEN.

1. SUBJECT. TALKING POINTS FOR WISNER'S USE WITH IAN
SMITH:

A. THE SECRETARY HAS ASKED ME TO SAY HE IS PLEASED
THAT YOU ARE RETURNING TO THE CONFERENCE, AS WE
CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THIS MEETING, WITH ALL ITS

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FAULTS, REPRESENTS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO REACH

A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT WILL ASSURE THE BEST POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR RHODESIA'S WHITE POPULATION BOTH DURING AND AFTER A TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE.

B. WE REMAIN DEDICATED TO THE GOAL OF MAJORITY RULE

WITH ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY. WE HAVE SYMPATHY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE CAUGHT UP IN THE RHODESIAN DILEMMA AND WILL DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE A SETTLEMENT THAT IS FAIR TO ALL.

C. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE ARGUED VIGOROUSLY FOR REALISM AND COMPROMISE ON THE NATIONALIST SIDE. THE SECRETARY HAS ONLY RECENTLY SENT PERSONAL MESSAGES TO THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS URGING THEM TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TOWARD THIS END.

D. AT THE SAME TIME, TO ACCOMPLISH THE KIND OF RESULTS BEING SOUGHT IN GENEVA, WE BELIEVE, AS THE SECRETARY ASKED THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO CONVEY TO YOU, THAT YOUR DELEGATION MUST PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY AT THIS STAGE. IN ALL CANDOR, WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED AT THE SCORN WHICH SOME OF YOUR DELEGATES HAVE EXPRESSED FOR NATIONALISTS ACTIONS AND POSITIONS. A MORE CONCILIATORY TONE WOULD SURELY FOSTER A MORE BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES AND A BETTER HEARING FOR RHODESIAN POSITIONS.

E. ON THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, WE BELIEVE THE TIME IS HERE FOR YOUR DELEGATION TO PRESENT SOME DETAILS AS TO THE KIND OF MACHINERY YOU WOULD ENVISION TO IMPLEMENT YOUR FIVE POINTS. HOWEVER, WHILE IT IS DESIRABLE THAT SUCH DETAILS BE PUT FORWARD IN A CONCILIATORY MANNER, WE WOULD CAUTION AGAINST YOUR PROPOSING THINGS FROM ANNEX C THAT THE CHAIRMAN MIGHT BE ABLE TO SUGGEST AS A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL INCORPORATING IDEAS FROM ALL SIDES.

F. WE RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTY HERE, BUT WE STILL
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BELIEVE IT BEST TO LET BASIC COMPROMISES COME FROM SOMEONE ELSE, PREFERABLY THE CHAIRMAN.

G. I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO REPEAT IN THIS CONNECTION, HOWEVER, THAT IT DOES NOT HELP TO DESCRIBE THE FIVE POINTS AS AN AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT BETWEEN YOU AND US OR THE BRITISH. AS YOU ARE PERFECTLY AWARE, THERE WAS AND IS NO SUCH CONTRACT, AND ANY EFFORT

TO GET THE NATIONALISTS TO MOVE TOWARD ANNEX C IS BOUND TO BE WEAKENED IF YOU REFUSE TO DISCUSS THE MERITS OF WHAT YOU WOULD PROPOSE UNDER THE FIVE POINTS. YOUR HINTS THAT THE FIVE POINTS WERE PART OF A GUARANTEE OF SOME SORT CARRY NO WEIGHT WITH THE NATIONALISTS WHO SEE NO REASON TO COMPROMISE TOWARD A NON-NEGOTIABLE POSITION.

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H. YOU SHOULD IN NO EVENT BE UNDER ANY MISAPPREHENSION THAT BY OUR PUBLIC SILENCE WE SUPPORT YOUR CHARACTERIZATION OF THE FIVE POINTS AS A COMPACT WITH US. WE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO MAKE THIS POINT CLEAR IF YOU REFUSED TO CONSIDER THEM NEGOTIABLE IN ANY WAY.

I. WHILE WE SAID WE WOULD NOT PRESS YOU TO GO BEYOND ANNEX C, WE DID NOT, AND COULD NOT, GUARANTEE THAT YOU COULD OBTAIN ALL OF ANNEX C, SINCE THE EVENTUAL CONTENTS OF AN AGREEMENT WILL DEPEND ON NEGOTIATIONS. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE ARE VARIATIONS OF ANNEX C THAT WOULD SERVE YOUR PURPOSES ALMOST AS WELL. FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES YOU MIGHT EVEN CONSIDER WHETHER CERTAIN NATIONALIST PROPOSALS COULD BE AMENDED TO MAKE THEM ACCEPTABLE, EVEN IF SUCH AMENDMENTS SEEM UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED BY THE NATIONALISTS.

J. THE NATIONALISTS' FEAR OF BEING TRICKED BY RHODESIAN FRONT MANIPULATION OF A PARITY SYSTEM HAS BEEN INCREASED BY SOME OF YOUR PARTY OFFICIAL'S STATEMENTS ABOUT HOW A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD WORK. STATEMENTS ABOUT WESTERN SUPPORT IN CASE OF

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THE CONFERENCE'S FAILURE HAVE ROUSED SIMILAR SUSPICIONS OF OUR INTENT IN ENCOURAGING THE CONFERENCE INITIALLY.

K. THESE KINDS OF STATEMENTS ENCOURAGE HARDER NATIONALIST POSITIONS. IT HAS MADE SOME INSIST UPON A GREATER BRITISH ROLE INSTEAD OF CONSIDERING COMPROMISE TOWARD WHITE RHODESIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. WHITE RHODESIAN REJECTION OF ANY BRITISH ROLE REINFORCES NATIONALIST FEARS THAT YOU WANT A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT YOU CAN MANIPULATE TO HEAD OFF MAJORITY RULE.

L. WHY IS THE RHODESIAN FRONT SO STRONGLY OPPOSED TO SOME BRITISH ROLE?

M. THE BRITISH ARE OBVIOUSLY NOT EAGER FOR A DIRECT
ROLE IN THE TRANSITION BUT HAVE INDICATED THEY
WOULD CONSIDER SOME KIND OF ROLE IF THERE WERE
GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL.

N. FACED WITH THE UNPLEASANT PROSPECTS THAT WOULD
FOLLOW IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL, A BRITISH ROLE MIGHT
ULTIMATELY OFFER GREATER PROTECTION TO THE WHITE

COMMUNITY THAN ANYTHING ELSE. AT THE VERY LEAST,
IT MIGHT OFFER A WAY OF GAINING ACCEPTANCE FOR THE
BASIC PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING ANNEX C.

O. DON'T MISUNDERSTAND, WE ARE NOT PUSHING FOR A
BRITISH ROLE OF ANY KIND, BUT THE SUBJECT ARISES
MORE AND MORE FREQUENTLY AND WE WONDER IF YOU
HAVE GIVEN IT FURTHER SERIOUS THOUGHT.

3. APPROVE -----
DISAPPROVE -----

4. DRAFTED: AF-WBEDMONDSON
CLEARED BY: AF-MR. SCHAUFLE, S-MR. PASSAGE
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ROBINSON

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